IMPLIED CONSENT TO A CHEMICAL TEST FOR
INTOXICATION: DOUBTS ABOUT SECTION
6-205 OF THE UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE
Every state makes it a crime to drive "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."' Often, however, an arresting officer's recollection of the
defendant's appearance and behavior is the prosecutor's only available
evidence.2 Conviction is obviously facilitated by scientific evidence showing the motorist's blood-alcohol level at the time of arrest,3 and under
many state statutes an alcohol content of .15 per cent or more raises a
rebuttable presumption of intoxication.4 The chemical test can be made
from a sample of the defendant's blood, breath, saliva or urine, 5 but
absent compulsion, suspects seldom supply such a sample. 6
I This is the standard in the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-902(a), and in most
state statutes. See Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal
Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. REy. 673, 674 n.2 (1960); Note, 37 N.D.L.
REv. 212,214 nn.17-21 (1961).
2 In Chicago, the officer fills out a form at the time of arrest and uses it to refresh
his memory at the trial. He notes odor of breath, color of face, condition of clothes,
use of profanity and appearance of eyes. Then if the suspect is willing to perform a
set of tests the officer notes his ability to balance, walk, turn, pick up coins, etc.
Chicago Police Department, Alcoholic Influence Report Form (1961). The suspect is
also asked specific questions about injuries, illnesses or use of medication to preclude
a subsequent alibi that they caused his condition. Cf. DONIGAN, CHErICAL Tasrs AND
THE LAW (Supp. 1961, at 3-11).
3 National Safety Council, Uses of Chemical Tests for Intoxication 1962; Dewey,
Message of the Governor, 1954 McKINNEY'S N.Y. Sass. LAWs 1341, 1342.
4 The UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-902(b) would reduce this content to .10%.
Conversely, most statutes also provide that a blood-alcohol level below .05% shall
indicate sobriety, but this is so low that as a practical matter few persons are freed
who prosecutors could otherwise have convicted. Statutes are collected in Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 n.3 (1957); National Committee on Uniform Traffic
Laws and Ordinances, Recent Developments in Chemical Test and Implied Consent
LAws 1, 9-10 (April 24, 1963).
5 A detailed description of the tests is beyond the scope of this comment. See
generally People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954);
Muehlberger, Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Influence, in DONIGAN, op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 163-80 (Appendix 1957); Burgee, A Study of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication, 17 MD. L. REv. 193, 194-200 (1957); Ladd & Gibson, The MedicoLegal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191,
193-215 (1939); Slough & Wilson, supra note 1, at 675-84; Note, 25 U. KAN. Cm L. Rv.
36, 41-49 (1956).
6 The courts have split on the admissibility of the fact of the defendant's refusal.
In some states it may be considered as a circumstance tending to show consciousness
of guilt. State v. Benson, 250 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941); Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954); City of Barron v. Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72
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Police have been reluctant to take the sample without consent. The
position of the New York attorney general is typical. "The safeguarding
of the body of a criminal defendant from harm or attack is an important
element in the administration of criminal law. I must advise you therefore that until the Legislature grants more specific authority your police
should not use compulsion or bodily force to obtain the evidence referred
to.,

7

Often, however, policemen at the scene of an accident find the driver
unconscious but note suspicious signs that he has been drinking. In
several such cases, realizing that the body oxidizes alcohol and thus in
time destroys the evidence, officers have ordered that the sample be
taken without waiting for the driver's consent.8 In Breithaupt v. A bram,9
the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction based on the test of a blood
sample drawn by a doctor in these circumstances.
Conscious motorists have less often had samples taken without their
consent. 10 Twelve states, however, have sought to obviate the need for
actual consent by adopting a statute reciting that the act of driving itself
constitutes an implied consent to submit to the chemical test." Under
these statutes a person may withdraw this "consent," but only at the
price of losing his driver's license. Section 6-205 of the Uniform Vehicle
Code is representative:
N.W.2d 387 (1955). In others it is inadmissible to avoid penalizing the motorist for
exercising a specific right to refuse the test. People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 145
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1955) (right granted by New York version of § 6-205); State v. Severson,
75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956) (right granted by statute); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d
1103 (Okla. Crim. 1957) (right granted by judicial decision). These and similar cases
are collected in State v. Munroe, 22 Conn. Supp. 321, 171 A.2d 419 (1961) (excluded
because of no probative value). Because of this split, the UNFORM VEHICIE CODE makes
§ 11-902(g), which allows comment, an optional provision.
7 1941 N.Y. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 146.
s See People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948);
Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951); State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 211
P.2d 142 (1949); State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940); State v. Sturtevant,
96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945). The
practice has continued, e.g., State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959); State v.
Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962).
9 352 U.S. 439 (1957), affirming 58 N.M. 585, 271 P.2d 827 (1954).
10 Contra, State v. Berg, 76 -Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953) (results admissible);
People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P.2d 924 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (admissible);
Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940) (inadmissible); see
United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954).
11 CONN. PUBLIC AcS No. 616 § 2 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-352 (Supp. 1963);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (Supp. 1963);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-727.03 (1960); N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1194(1); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.2 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1963); S.D. CODE
§ 44.0302-2 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1188 (Supp. 1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (Supp. 1962).
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(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent...
to a chemical test ... for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for any offense arising out
of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was
driving ... a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test ... shall be administered at the direction
of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to
believe the person to have been [so] driving ....
(b) Any person who is dead, unconscious or who is otherwise
in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent ....
(c) If a person under arrest refuses ... to submit to a chemical
test ... as provided in paragraph (a) ... none shall be given,
but the department ... shall revoke his license or permit to
drive .... 12
Such statutes have survived all constitutional attacks to date's and
have been unanimously praised in the law reviews. 14 Drivers' arguments
12 The UNIFORI VEHICLE CODE was prepared by the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. It has the support of the National Safety
Council and was introduced, in substance, in twenty-four state legislatures in 1963.
See National Committee, supra note 4, at 7. No analysis of construction problems is
presented here. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064; Weinstein, Statute Compelling
Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 J. C iu. L., C. & P.S. 541 (1955);
Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 886 (1963). See also the UNIFORM CHEMICAL Trsr FOR INTOXICATION Aar §§ 1-15, 9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1963, at 51-59), approved by the American Bar
Association in 1957. 43 A.B.A.J. 1056 (1957).
13 State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) (dictum); Lee v. State, 187
Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415,110
N.W.2d 75 (1961); Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(dictum); Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961) (dictum); Walton v. City of
Roanoke, 133 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 1963). In addition, at least one court has suggested,
without discussion, that its state legislature adopt such a law. State v. Wolf, 53 Del. 88,
164 A.2d 865 (1960). In its original form, the New York implied consent law was
struck down for failing to provide the driver a hearing before revocation. Sehutt v.
MacDuff, supra. That has been corrected in all states, however, and subsequent
objections based on procedural due process have failed. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11
N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962); Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 178,
176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d
257 (Sup. CL 1955); People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1954).
14 Slough & Wilson, supra note 1, at 684-99; Weinstein, supra note 12; Note, 6
B3AYLOR L. REv. 404 (1954); Comment, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1195 (1953); Comment, 35
TExAs L. REv. 813 (1957); Note, 25 U. KAN. CrrY L. REv. 36 (1956); Note, 49 VA. L.
REv. 386 (1963); Comment, 17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 299 (1960); Note, 1960 WASH.
U.L.Q. 84; cf. DONIGAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 94-147; Ladd & Gibson, supra
note 5, at 215-41; Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to
Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 40 ILL. L. REv. 245, 249-56 (1945); Comment, 23
TENN. L. R1v. 178 (1954). But cf., Comment, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 351.
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may have failed, however, because they have raised only self-incrimination, due process or search and seizure objections which the courts have
properly rejected on the basis of established doctrine. It is urged here
that the federal constitutional issue would be more sharply posed by
arguing that an incriminating sample of body fluid or breath submitted
under the terms of the statute is analogous to a coerced confession.
Clearly the statutory recitation of implied consent does not change
the issues involved. A legislature cannot consent on behalf of an individual if actual consent is really required, and the fiction of an act
evidencing consent is not persuasive when the act is one so common as
driving a car. 15 The theory underlying state jurisdiction over nonresident motorists, 16 sometimes cited as an example of implied consent, 17
is not in point. The Supreme Court has dismissed the "implied consent"
used there as "fictive talk" and recognized that "in point of fact .. .
jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on consent at all.... We have
held that this is a fair rule of law ...and that the requirements of due
process are therefore met .....18 The chemical test statutes likewise do
not involve actual consent; they present the question whether police
can take from a person under lawful arrest a sample of blood, breath,
saliva or urine-not by physical force-but by imposing a severe sanction
for failure to cooperate.
Drivers' defenses based solely on the privilege against self-incrimination have not prevailed because that doctrine does not protect "real
evidence."' 9 Nor have arguments based upon the "shocks the conscience"
due process standard of Rochin v. California20 succeeded. That case
involved evidence obtained by pumping a suspect's stomach against
his will to recover morphine capsules. Under section 6-205 the physical
taking of blood, breath, saliva or urine is a non-brutal process lacking
the offensiveness of the course of conduct involved in Rochin.
Arguments that chemical testing constitutes an unreasonable search
and seizure have likewise failed.21 One court held a breath test was not
15 See Note, Consent, Liability and Guilt: A Study in Judicial Method, 7 STAN. L.
RFv. 507 (1955).
16 See especially, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), affirming 250 Mass. 22, 144
N.E. 760 (1924).
17 Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961); Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act, 9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1963, at 51-52).
18 Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
19 United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954); 8 WIGoMRE, EvmxucE
§§ 2263, 2265(5) (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
20 342 U.S. 165 (1954).
21 In many states the issue has not been raised because prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1963), many state courts did not exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence,
in reliance upon Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Mapp overruled Wolf.
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a search since the police were only "capturing" the air the suspect exhaled. 22 Other courts have found a search but have called it reasonable
because it was made under special circumstances. 23 In Carrollv. United
States, the seizure of illegal whiskey from a car was permitted "because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought." 24 Here, too, the natural body
processes oxidizing the alcohol makes prompt seizure essential. Although in circumstances where the defendant was not under arrest a
few courts have excluded chemical test evidence on search and seizure
grounds, 25 the requirements of section 6-205-arrest and reasonable
grounds--eliminate that objection.
But, arguably, something more basic is involved than is articulated
by these three objections to the admissibility of the test. Ingrained in
our legal system is the attitude that a person charged with crime is not
required to assume the prosecutor's burden of proving him guilty. Indeed, the very requirements of reasonable cause and particular evidence
which justify a search are factors which make state aggressiveness objectionable if it is designed to make the defendant the means of his
own conviction.2 6 How to conceptualize this objection to intoxication
test statutes has so far eluded both defendants and judges.
In Boyd v. United States27 the Court attempted the conceptualization
in an equally difficult situation. Under the statute there struck down,
the defendant was required either to provide incriminating invoices
or to have the Government's allegations concerning them taken as true.
The Supreme Court called this dilemma "tantamount to compelling...
production" 28 of private papers protected by the privilege against selfincrimination. Its holding, however, linked the fourth and fifth amendments, the Court concluding that this violation of the fifth made the
seizure per se "unreasonable" under the fourth.29 A contemporary court
State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
People v. Pack, 199 Cal. App. 2d 857, 19 Cal. Reptr. 186 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954); cf. Blackford v.
United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
24 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
25 State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis.
266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956); cf. Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
26 For example, it is the danger of incrimination that activates the fifth amendment
privilege. In England, the Judge's Rules require warning a person of his right not to
make a statement only after the police suspect him of the crime under investigation.
St. Johnston, The Legal Limitation of the Interrogation of Suspects and Prisoners in
England and Wales, 39 J. CRim. L. & C. 89, 94 (1948).
27 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28 Id. at 621-22.
22
23

29

Id. at 630.
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probably would find this construction theoretically unsatisfactory. But
on the basis of an analogy to the coerced confession cases an argument
for the constitutional exclusion in criminal proceedings of evidence
obtained under the similar dilemma of section 6-205 can be made. 30
One important reason for the coerced confession exclusionary rule
is to preserve an "accusatorial, adversary trial" by preventing "prosecutorial circumvention of trial safeguards" in the state's effort to produce
evidence having "a powerful impact on the triers of fact, substantially
increasing the probabilities of conviction." 31 In both Rochin v. California3 2 and Mapp v. Ohio3 the Court analogized rules governing the
admissibility of real evidence to the coerced confession exclusionary
rule. Even proponents of statutes like section 6-205 seem to concede that
coercion is involved, 34 but one has called it "refined."35 Sophisticated
37
6
coercion has, however, often been struck down.3 In Lynumn v. Illinois,
for example, a confession was found constitutionally inadmissible because made in response to a statement by the arresting officer that the
defendant's relief payments would be cut off and she would lose her
children if she did not cooperate. Some writers have argued that since a
driver's license is often called a "privilege," taking it away for failure
to take a chemical test is not subject to objection.3 8 There is no greater
right to a relief check, but the threat of cancellation, because it was
used coercively, was sufficient to make the Court reverse the conviction
in Lynumn.
However, some courts have implicitly followed a distinction between
forcing an affirmative act-the usual coerced confession situation-and
30 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2184a, 2264 n.4 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
31 Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases In Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L.
REv. 313, 315, 320, 325 (1964). Many of the coerced confession cases also turn to some
extent on a desire to exclude evidence of questionable reliability or to deter the police
from using brutality. Neither of these objections can be made to the admission of
intoxication tests obtained under the procedures of § 6-205. See authorities cited
note 5 supra and textual discussion accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
32 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1954).
33 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961).

34 Dewey, supra note 3; Weinstein, supra note 12, at 543 n.7.
35 Weinstein, supra note 12, at 543 n.7.
36 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Blackburn v. Alabama, 861 U.S. 199
(1960); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
37 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
38 Mamet, supra note 14, at 257; Slough & Wilson, supra note 1, at 701; Comment,
35 TExAs L. REV. 813 (1957); Comment, 17 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 299 (1960); Note, 1960
WASH. U.L.Q. 84; cf. Proceedings in the Committee on the Uniform Chemical
Test for Intoxication Act of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, August 23,
1956 (mimeographed transcript).
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simply taking evidence as in the traditional search and seizure. Thus,
at the extremes they have condemned compelling a conscious defendant
to himself give a urine sample because this required his aid,39 and
they have sustained a doctor's taking a blood sample from an uncon40
scious defendant because the suspect was passive.
The distinction between these situations does not seem well-considered.
It is ultimately premised on a dichotomy between body and mind that
concludes that a man's "body" is only acted upon, i.e. searched, while
it is only his conscious "will" that acts and can be coerced. Rochin and
Mapp are prime examples, however, of the Supreme Court's willingness
to extend coerced confession cases beyond verbal acts. In cases involving
hypnosis and truth serum, 4 ' the "will" is rendered ineffective and the
"body" reveals its secrets, but even where the truth is thus exposed the
technique has been held to violate due process. Such cases illustrate that
the crucial test is the effect of the evidence on the distribution of the
burden of proof between the state and the "whole defendant"-regardless of consciousness, the "will" and like concepts. Similarly, under
statutes like the Uniform Vehicle Code section 6-205, the coercive threat
of a license suspension is used to force the defendant to permit the
police to take a sample of body fluid or breath which may well provide
the prosecutor with a statutory presumption of guilt. Applying the
coerced confession rationale, the test results should be excluded.
Of course no defendant may be completely uncooperative. In at least
two situations he must affirmatively aid the prosecutor. First, he may be
required to appear in court, stand up,4 2 try on a blouse 43 and similarly
be identified. 44 These acts tend to be many inductive steps iemoved
from a finding of guilt. Second, he may be forced to submit records
required by law to be kept for a valid independent purpose even if that
evidence will lead to his conviction; 45 however this exception to the fifth
39 Booker v. Cincinnati, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 286, 1 Ohio Supp. 152 (C.P. 1936);
Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Grim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940). But cf. United States v.
Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954).
40 People v. Pack, 199 Gal. App. 2d 857, 19 Cal. Reptr. 186 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577,
160 P.2d 283 (1945). But cf. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
41 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
42 Roberson v. United States, 282 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1960).
43 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
44 DONIGAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 115-23; INBAU,
CAN AN AccusED PERSON BE COMPELLED To Do? (1950).

SELF-INCRIMINATION:

WHAT

45 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); cf. United States v. White, 822 U.S.
694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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amendment apparently does not apply to evidence relevant only to the
46
crime in question.
The requirement of fingerprinting, often analogized to that of chemical
testing, combines the best of each exception; the prints when taken are
not, of themselves, proof of guilt in the particular case, and they serve
the independent purpose of identification and record keeping. Chemical
testing, however, combines the worst of each. There is no independent
record-keeping purpose, and, with the statutory presumption, the test of
itself is sufficient to shift the burden of proof. The coerced confession
rationale is strikingly apposite.
Breithaupt v. Abram47 is Supreme Court authority permitting compulsory testing, but it is not dispositive of the issues raised here. The
case was heard three years after Rochin and eight years after Wolf v.
Colorado.4 s The state court had conceded that taking blood from the
defendant while he was unconscious and not under arrest violated his
constitutional rights, 49 but it refused to require exclusion of the evidence
on this ground. The case thus raised the issue of the effect of Rochin
upon Wolf. The Supreme Court simply reaffirmed Wolf and applied the
due process standard of Rochin narrowly, holding that the Justices were
not shocked by the sanitary taking of blood. 50 No consideration of the
coerced confession analogy was made.
Subsequent history shows the foundation of Breithaupt has eroded.
Since Mapp v. Ohio5l overruled Wolf, the illegal seizure of evidence
itself violates due process regardless of an independent "shock" to the
court. A case with the same facts as Breithaupt would now go the other
way. The Breithauptopinion does suggest, however, the extent to which
the Court was impressed with the serious need for deterring drunken
driving. 52 No realistic prediction of judicial behavior in this area should
ignore the fact that the courts are aware of the serious social problem
46 See Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 687 (1951); ef. Communist Party of the United
States v. United States, No. 17583, D.C. Cir., Dec. 17, 1963.
47

352 U.S. 432 (1957).

48 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf had held that due process did not require the states to
exclude illegally seized evidence in criminal trials.
49 58 N.M. 385, 391, 271 P.2d 827, 830 (1954).
50 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black and Douglas argued that
Rochin required exclusion of all evidence obtained by entering the human body.
352 U.S. at 440 (dissenting opinion).
51 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52 352 U.S. at 439. See also Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 571, 358 P.2d 765, 769
(1961); Schutt v. McDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 46, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Alexander v. State, 305 P.2d 572, 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
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posed by intoxicated drivers. Of course, no one can doubt this danger.53
But citizens have an equally significant interest in preventing "shortcuts
54
to criminal-law enforcement."
The use of the criminal process brings into play the great range of
protections afforded an accused. If only retention of a license is at stake
it should be noted, however, that important factors change. The quantum
of proof required for revocation is substantially less than for a criminal
conviction. The First Circuit has said, for example, that "reason to believe" the driver intoxicated is a constitutionally sufficient ground for a
license revocation.P5 Although the distinction between civil and criminal
penalties may be criticized where as here both sanctions go to the same
problem,5 6 by the same showing now required to set in motion the
process of chemical testing, a state could, acting in a purely administrative capacity, help keep drunk drivers off the roads. License revocation
would be sustained as a technique for highway regulation; it is less
likely to be so when invoked solely to obtain a criminal conviction.
Even in practice, statutes using the implied consent theory have been
only qualified successes. The Vermont court, in sustaining its statute,
said the provisions for procedural due process were so complicated that
it was doubtful the end would ever be really achieved. 57 A New York
court held a recent amendment prevented conviction where the prisoner
refused the test-no matter what other proof was available. 58 The Utah
court dismissed two convictions because the defendants had not been
given a choice of tests.59 Such potential impracticalities, combined with
the constitutional uncertainties, cast doubt upon the wisdom and desirability of adopting statutes like Uniform Vehicle Code section 6-205.
53 Estimates vary as to the percentage of accidents involving drunken drivers, but
all agree the figure is high. See Campbell, Courts and ProsecutorsAre the Weak Link
in PreventingDrunken Driving, 46 A.B.A.J. 43 (1960) (cites estimates that it is 50% or
more); Note, 6 BAYLOR L. REy. 404 (1954) (figure 50% in Texas in 1952); Comment,
35 TExAs L. REv. 813 (1957) (33% to 50% of all accidents).
54 Will, Recent Federal Cases, 44 CHI. BAR Rr-c. 64 (1962).
55 Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 884 (1st Cir. 1953).

56 See Conway, Is Criminal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of Traffic
Laws? (pts. 1 & 2), 1959 Wis. L. RELv. 418, 1960 Wis. L. Ray. 3.
57 State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962). Indeed the court found that the
statute negatived its own implied consent provision.
58 People v. Wagonseller, 25 Misc. 2d 217, 205 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Plattsburgh City Ct.

1960).
59 Bean v. State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P.2d 750 (1961); Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d
287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959).

